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I believe that nothing is more important than for us to recognize that we are 
bound and sworn to what provokes our most intense disgust. 
-Georges Bataille, ‘Attraction and Repulsion II’ 
 
…to learn to taste again, so that we can learn to maintain our disgust more 
easily than we can learn to maintain what disgusts us. But this will require a 
transformation of the five senses, a new perspective, a new aesthetics.  
-Stanley Cavell, ‘On Makavejev On Bergman’ 
 
 
Though disgust has long been a subject of anxious speculation for a range of 
Western thinkers—from Kant, Nietzsche and Freud, to Sartre, Bataille and 
Kristeva—the critical stakes of such discussions have, until recently, 
remained relatively unexplored in the discipline of film studies. Historically, 
the specificity of disgust as a distinctive component of film aesthetics and 
spectatorship has been sidelined in favour of an exploration of cognate 
concepts—abjection, unpleasure, l’informe, horror, or the unpresentable, for 
instance—which offer different explanatory frameworks for the range of 
objects or experiences that might be encompassed by the notion of disgust. 
Recently, there has been a revitalisation of debates pertaining to disgust from 
across a range of disciplines, as witnessed by publications in the fields of 
philosophical aesthetics, phenomenology, cognitive and moral psychology, 
literary theory, and feminist and queer theory.1 Film scholars, too, have 
                                                
1 A sampling of these works include: Miller 1998, Probyn 2000, Menninghaus 2003, 
Kolnai 2004, Nussbaum 2004, Ahmed 2004, Ngai 2005, Schnall et. al 2008, 
Korsmeyer 2011.  
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started to re-assess the significance of disgust in recent years.2 What unites 
much of this interdisciplinary work on disgust is a shared concern with 
thinking through the relations between bodily sensation, emotion, and 
cognition (especially as these are mediated by films and other cultural forms), 
and with probing the political, moral, and ethical implications that arise 
from those particular conditions of embodiment. In this context, disgust is a 
uniquely privileged concept, which allows us to telescope questions of 
corporeality and cognition, and affect and emotion, with those of socio-
morality, ethics, and politics. As Carl Plantinga points out, disgust ‘begins as 
a guardian of the mouth, extends to the protection of the “temple of the 
body”, and finally becomes the guardian “of human dignity in the social 
order”’ (Plantinga 2009, 205). Indeed, disgust’s distinctly polymorphic 
nature—at once a visceral reflex (physical, primordial, ‘unthought’) and 
learned emotional response (cognitive, culturally-conditioned, evaluative), a 
form both of repulsion (inciting nauseated recoil and rejection) and 
attraction (sticky and contagious, it entices us to look, to linger, to tarry with 
the disgusting thing)—makes it a particularly useful focal point for some of 
the questions that have concerned film theory and philosophy in recent years. 
From the so-called ‘sensuous’ turn in film theory, with its emphasis on 
visceral and carnal aspects of spectatorship (Vivian Sobchack, Laura U. 
Marks, Martine Beugnet), or the recent work on cinematic emotions, 
affective agency, and the ‘aesthetic paradox’ of disgust (Berys Gaut, Torben 
Grodal, Carl Plantinga), to the renewed interest in the ethics of spectatorship, 
including an address to the ethical value of unpleasure (Sarah Cooper, Lisa 
Downing and Libby Saxton, Michele Aaron), the strategic positioning of 
disgust makes it a useful critical device for thinking through some of the 
most pertinent questions in film-philosophy today. 
This special issue of Film-Philosophy recognizes this strategic location 
of disgust at the crossroads of some of the most recent film theoretical 
debates around questions of embodiment, sensation, affect, emotion, 
cognition, philosophical aesthetics, politics, ethics, and so on. Taking its cue 
from Bataille’s entreaty that we should acknowledge that we are ‘bound and 
sworn to what provokes our most intense disgust’, and, equally, from Stanley 
Cavell’s suggestion that we should ‘learn to maintain our disgust more easily 
than we can learn to maintain what disgusts us’, the aim of this special issue 
is to respond to the critical—and deeply ethical—challenge of tarrying with 
disgust. Contributors to the issue respond to this challenge in a variety of 
ways: the issue synthesizes a range of theoretical perspectives—drawing 
together insights from the work of Freud, Kant, Kolnai, Deleuze, Bataille, 
and Derrida, to name a few—and opens new reflections and orientations 
                                                
2 See in particular: Barker 2009, Hanich 2009, Plantinga 2009, Kleinhans 2009 and 
2010. 
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through close readings of an eclectic selection of films. Although each piece 
focuses on a distinctive dimension of disgust, points of intersection emerge 
around key conceptual strands, including a shared emphasis on cinematic 
disgust as a form of ‘affective contagion’, on disgust’s structural, formal, and 
temporal qualities, and its ethical, intersubjective nature, or its relation to 
questions of radical alterity, absence, and the void. Collectively, the issue’s 
wide-ranging and provocative insights amply demonstrate the value of 
disgust for film-philosophy, and signpost points of entry for future research. 
One important reference point for several contributors to this issue, 
and for reflections about the role of disgust for film-philosophy more 
generally, is Noël Carroll’s Philosophy of Horror. In this influential work, 
Carroll examines disgust as one of the variants of unpleasure that is central 
to the experience of horror. Working from a cognitivist framework, Carroll 
reads disgust as one of the main ‘cognitive emotions’ that horror films work 
to produce in spectators through an appeal to the slimy, viscous, and 
culturally transgressive presence of monsters (Carroll, 1990). Carroll’s 
account does register something of the phenomenological experience of 
compromising closeness between spectator and filmic materiality transacted 
through the encounter with the disgusting object; yet for Carroll, the strong 
physiological and emotional claims made on the spectator in the experience 
of disgust are inextricably bound, and even subordinate, to the spectator’s 
active intellectual curiosity and cognitive participation in the narrative and its 
resolution. Disgust, he notes, ‘might be seen as part of the price to be paid 
for the pleasure of [the monster’s] disclosure’ adding that ‘[i]t is not that we 
crave disgust, but that disgust is a predictable concomitant of disclosing the 
unknown, whose disclosure is a desire the narrative instills in the audience 
and then goes on to gladden’ (Carroll 1990, 184-5). While Carroll’s account 
of disgust has in many ways laid the groundwork for film-philosophical 
discussions of disgust, and has been exceptionally productive for thinking 
about the complex relays between physiological response, affect, emotion, 
and cognition at work in the cinematic experience, his account of disgust 
tends to ‘clean up’ much of what it would attempt to analyse, swiftly 
converting the intense phenomenological experiences relayed by disgust into 
a fixed and neatly contained moment to be left behind by narrative teleology. 
In his view, the physiological ‘revolt’ implicit in disgust appears as something 
to be mastered and redeemed by cognitive processes. This emphasis on the 
narrative and cognitive processes at the expense of an up-close, 
phenomenologically-inflected look at disgust’s myriad manifestations is 
something that each of the contributors to this special issue seeks to redress 
in different ways.  
Julian Hanich’s article, ‘Toward a Poetics of Cinematic Disgust’ 
represents just such a call for a more balanced approach to thinking about 
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the role of emotion, cognition, and physical sensation in the experience of 
disgust. Building on his previous work on disgust and other negative 
emotions in cinema, Hanich’s essay for this special issue lays the foundations 
for a ‘poetics of cinematic disgust’, whose aim is ultimately to ‘enable a more 
fine-grained discussion about one specific cinematic emotion’. Challenging 
the common-sense notion that the evocation of disgust is as straightforward 
as simply putting something disgusting in front of the camera, Hanich’s piece 
demonstrates that the poetics of cinematic disgust are much more complex 
and nuanced than they may first appear. Central to Hanich’s taxonomy of 
disgust are the five categorical distinctions that he establishes for thinking 
about the choices filmmakers have at their disposal when trying to disgust us, 
including decisions regarding ‘temporality’, ‘presence’, ‘character 
engagement’, ‘synaesthetic audiovision’, and ‘affective co-occurrence’. In 
demonstrating the multiplicity of techniques and the complexity of response 
involved in cinematic disgust—and providing examples of these from a 
dizzying array of filmic case-studies—Hanich’s article amply demonstrates 
the variety and often-overlooked subtlety of disgust. As Carolyn Korsmeyer 
points out in her recently published book Savoring Disgust: The Fair and the 
Foul in Aesthetics, it is precisely the more nuanced possibilities embedded in 
disgust that are often disregarded. She notes that although ‘disgust is almost 
always taken to be an extreme emotion’, it has many more ‘subtle variants’ 
and components ranging from eroticism and beauty, to humour, irony, and 
sorrow (Korsmeyer, 9-11). Hanich’s findings in this essay demonstrate that 
the same insight holds for thinking about cinematic disgust, and in a similar 
vein, he concludes: ‘Precisely because we think it is such a primitive or basic 
emotion, we tend to overlook its intricacy at the movies.’ 
Tarja Laine’s article, ‘Imprisoned in Disgust: Roman Polanski’s 
Repulsion’, shares an interest in the role of cinematic emotions, and her essay 
develops a reading of the spectator-screen relation as a complex exchange 
between the film’s ‘affective influence’, and the spectator’s ‘affective 
appraisal’ and ‘emotional agency’. Such a model of film spectatorship as an 
affective exchange, she notes, is ‘complicated when disgust comes into the 
frame’. Through a close reading of Roman Polanski’s masterpiece of 
cinematic disgust, Laine concludes that disgust can have the effect of 
confusing the distinction between a film’s ‘emotional core’ and the 
spectator’s own emotional agency. Repulsion’s ‘ultra-sensitivity to the 
world’, she writes, creates an affective, physical, and emotional experience of 
disgust that is overpowering, and which leaves no room for the kind of 
cathartic pleasure or cognitive mastery described by Noël Carroll. Rather, 
disgust is something embodied and lived through by both the film and its 
spectators, whether they “like” it or not. However, Laine is careful to note 
that this ‘overwhelmingly disgusting experience of watching Repulsion does 
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not equate to passivity’, since, in her view, ‘our affect remains continually 
directed towards the film’ as something we actively engage with at the level 
of affective appraisal. As with other contributors to this issue, Laine’s 
insights on disgust have important implications for thinking about the 
aesthetic paradox of unpleasure. In her assessment, Repulsion offers a 
particularly pertinent limit-case in which disgust is not readily convertible 
into pleasurable cognitive satisfaction. Ultimately, her reading of the film 
suggests that we may need to re-think theories that construct unpleasure as 
antithetical to aesthetic experience. In this, she joins Korsmeyer and other 
thinkers who have recently suggested that we may need to abandon the 
pleasure-unpleasure binary, in favor of thinking about disgust as ‘modifier of 
attention, intensifying for a host of reasons some experience that the 
participant would rather have continue than not’ (Korsmeyer 2011, 118). 
Indeed, as Laine puts it, it is possible that what we value in cinematic 
renderings of disgust is precisely the ‘vivid and immediate experience’ that it 
offers us, ‘regardless of its non-pleasurable, non-rewarding features’. 
Eugenie Brinkema’s article, ‘Laura Dern’s Vomit, or, Kant and Derrida 
in Oz’ takes up Derrida’s reading of the central, structuring role of disgust in 
Kant’s aesthetic philosophy, in order to perform an intricate reading of two 
films by David Lynch. Beginning with a discussion of Lynch’s early short 
film, Six Figures Getting Sick, Brinkema calls for an understanding of disgust 
not as substance but as structure: Lynch’s film is not about ‘men getting sick’ 
so much as, for her, ‘the sickness of and on form’. Following Derrida’s 
reading of vomit in ‘Economimesis’, Brinkema reads disgust as that which 
‘structures the very form of exclusion in Kantian thought’; at the absolute 
limit of the beautiful, it is the ‘unintegratable aspect of the aesthetic that the 
aesthetic cannot speak’. This understanding of disgust as that which cannot 
be spoken has important implications for thinking about disgust in cinematic 
terms, as it suggests that one of disgust’s hallmarks is that it is never fully 
present to itself, never locatable in its reputed objects or in relation to its 
possible provocations (the disgusting thing). Brinkema’s piece reads disgust 
through the fugitive designation of ‘something worse than the worst’: ‘not 
substance but structure around which forces bend, contract, mobilize’. 
Brinkema’s essay teases out this distinction between disgust-as-substance and 
disgust-as-structure through an illuminating comparison between the role of 
vomit in Lukas Moodysson’s A Hole in My Heart and David Lynch’s Wild at 
Heart. Instead of ‘recuperating disgust for the visual’, as the vomitous climax 
of Moodysson’s film arguably does, Laura Dern’s vomit in Wild at Heart 
figures disgust primarily through the parasensual dimension of smell. In Wild 
at Heart, Brinkema notes, the smell of sick lingers, permeates, and yet—as 
smell—is not fully locatable within the film’s audio-visual economy. As 
Brinkema argues, this displacement from the visual onto the olfactory has the 
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effect of holding open the place of ‘the something more disgusting than the 
disgusting’, of asking us to tarry with disgust’s sensual workings, and with a 
‘worse that is always yet to come’. For Brinkema, it is ultimately Lynch’s 
‘commitment to letting his vomit smell’ that grounds an ethical promise: in 
keeping the movement and possibility of disgust open, refusing to fill it in 
with the ‘merely disgusting’, Lynch’s work may well be a step in the direction 
of the sort of ‘new aesthetics’ called for by Cavell when he advocates that we 
should ‘learn to maintain our disgust more easily than we learn to maintain 
what disgusts us’ (Cavell in Rothman 2005, 36).  
A similar emphasis on the ethics of disgust is at the core of Jennifer 
Barker’s contribution to this special issue. Her article, ‘Chew on This: 
Disgust, Delay, and the Documentary Image in Food, Inc.’ suggests that a 
similar distinction be made between the depiction of objects and subjects of 
disgust, and the process by which films might be said to directly perform 
physical and moral disgust through cinematic means. Drawing from the 
work of Sara Ahmed, Barker considers the constitutive ‘betweenness’ of 
disgust, noting that disgust is ‘less about objects or subjects than it is a 
relation in time and space’. For Barker, it is the distinctive movement of 
disgust—defined as a trajectory from a compromising closeness to a turning 
away in revulsion—that is key for thinking about the cinematic relations that 
Food, Inc. establishes between its subjects and its spectators. Barker’s subtle 
account discloses how Food, Inc. sometimes performs this movement of 
disgust by referring spectators to its own embodied agency, encouraging an 
empathy with its bodily movements toward and away from objects of 
disgust. However, as Barker notes, the film performs its visceral disgust most 
powerfully when it pointedly does not reveal its objects of disgust. Barker 
writes, ‘[w]hereas some laudible activist documentaries relish and rely on the 
“in your face” immediacy of documentary images’, Food, Inc. emphasises 
instead the ambivalence of disgust, in which there is never a ‘strict division 
between subject and object, but rather involves the movement between 
them’. Drawing from the work of Malin Wahlberg, she describes such 
moments, when the disgusting thing is withheld from our vision, as ‘frame-
breaking events’ in which the viewer’s affective response to the screen is 
heightened by an emphasis on delay and absence, rather than immediacy and 
presence. For Barker, such ‘frame-breaking events’ in Food, Inc. bring into 
focus a phenomenological similarity between disgust and the documentary 
image. Both, she writes, ‘operate in and as the space in-between presence and 
absence, here and there, now and then, subject and object’. Ultimately, the 
ethical value of disgust for Barker derives not from its capacity to deliver an 
intense visceral charge in the present, but from its sticky, residual nature, and 
its ability to re-structure relations between spectator and screen, past and 
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present, and between the corporeal, the affective, and the reflective 
dimensions of film spectatorship. 
Steven Shaviro’s work has long been interested in the way that cinema 
structures relations between bodies and affects, and politics and economics. 
His piece for this special issue, ‘Body Horror and Post-Socialist Cinema: 
Györgi Pálfi’s Taxidermia’, takes up such questions through a detailed 
analysis of Pálfi’s epic—and epically disgusting—masterpiece of post-Soviet 
cinema. Shaviro’s article focuses on the contradictory extremes that the film 
holds in tension, noting that it is at once ‘intimately physical in its 
exploration of masculine desire and physical disgust’ and ‘sardonically 
distanced’ and ‘icily allegorical’ in its portrayal of Hungary’s social and 
political past. Through an intricate reading of Taxidermia’s tri-partite 
structure, which charts a trajectory from fascism, to communism, to 
capitalism, Shaviro considers the way that the film mobilises physical disgust 
(amongst other affects) in order to make visible and audible the ‘concrete 
bodily practices’ that articulate power relations in each successive regime. 
The value of Taxidermia’s exaggerated deployment of disgust, for Shaviro, is 
its ability to ‘literalize, to implant directly in the flesh, and to present to us 
onscreen’ what is otherwise a ‘diffuse and impalpable network of power 
relations, social norms, and ideological background assumptions’. Each of 
the male bodies on screen present what Shaviro refers to as direct ‘body-
images’: in all three cases, ‘the men’s bodies directly register, and suffer, the 
social forces that pass through them and mold them’. As Shaviro is careful to 
note, although the film charts a historical trajectory through these ‘body-
images’, it systematically avoids presenting this trajectory as a process of 
organic development. Rather, it presents them as a series of ‘spatial 
juxtapositions’ and ‘analogical correspondences’; its body-images, presented 
without development or psychological explanation, are ‘immediately visceral, 
and indeed disgusting’. The film, he notes, ‘operates by a sort of affective 
contagion. It forces us to feel’, but also operates through an allegorical mode 
that implies the opposite: distance, abstraction, intellectualism. Shaviro notes 
that the ‘cognitive dissonance’ produced as a result is ‘itself the whole point 
of Taxidermia’: the film’s superimposition of the visceral and the intellectual, 
the affective and the cognitive, leads, in Shaviro’s assessment, to ‘a flattening, 
a reduction of dimensions’ in which ‘[r]eflection is folded back into 
immediate experience’. But given all of the ‘fleshy excesses’ of the film, 
Shaviro’s reading of Taxidermia suggests that the political value of disgust 
might ultimately lie elsewhere. Just as Taxidermia’s final sequence refers us 
precisely to ‘the void of Lajos’s evacuated insides’, so, too, do its disgusting 
images refer to another, more profound variety of disgust—that of Bataille’s 
‘inner experience’—as the form of ‘exclusion that haunts the capitalist order’. 
This excluded disgust may perform a more profound political diagnosis, even 
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if, in Shaviro’s view, it does not constitute a direct challenge to our current 
capitalist reality. 
There is much still to be considered about disgust, and it is hoped that 
the range of reflections on cinematic disgust in this special issue will continue 
to provoke questions and incite future research into the value of disgust for 
film studies. I would like to thank each of the contributors for the lively and 
stimulating articles that have come about as a result of their own efforts to 
tarry with disgust. Thanks too, to all those at Film-Philosophy who provided 
valuable feedback and suggestions. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to 
David Sorfa for his expert guidance and advice, and for his reflections on 
vomit, which served as a particular source of inspiration for the special issue. 
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